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Not the Only Game in Town: 
The Complementary Roles of 
Public & Private Environmental 
Governance1
Professor Sarah E. Light
On August 3, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a final 
rule, known as the Clean Power Plan (CPP), to curb greenhouse gas emissions 
from coal-fired power plants.2
Acting pursuant to its authority to regulate “any air 
pollutant” under the Clean Air Act, the CPP calls for a 
32 percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from 
coal-fired power plants (compared to baseline 2005 
levels) by 2030.3 Part of the Obama Administration’s 
comprehensive Climate Action Plan, the CPP further 
propels the country towards meeting the EPA’s goal of 
reducing economy-wide emissions to 17 percent below 
2005 levels by 2020 and 26-28 percent by 2025.4 The 
electricity/power-generation sector is the nation’s largest 
contributor to greenhouse gas emissions—responsible 
for approximately one third of all carbon dioxide emis-
sions, followed by the transportation sector, industrial 
sources, and other commercial and residential sources 
(see Figure 1).5 
These emissions reduction targets set by the U.S. 
government reflect the Administration’s deep concern 
about climate change and its negative environmental, 
social, and economic effects.6 The CPP affords flexibil-
ity to the states in how to meet these targets, including 
through the use of efficiency improvements, switch-
ing to natural gas generation, and increasing the use of 
renewables to generate power. The CPP also provides 
flexibility to states to use different policy approaches 
SUMMARY
• This Brief focuses on ways in which private firms are adopting 
tools that mirror public law instruments—such as internal carbon 
fees (similar to a public carbon tax) and private cap-and-trade 
schemes (like public emissions trading schemes)—to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and address climate change. 
•  These private case studies suggest that significant progress 
in reducing emissions can come from embedding emissions 
reduction programs into core business strategy. Public regulators 
therefore should consider the importance of making regula-
tions an integral part of business strategy, rather than solely 
an environmental “compliance” issue.
•  Moreover, these case studies indicate that climate change, 
as a global issue, requires public regulators to recognize the 
potential contributions of global multinational firms. The EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan allows for flexibility in the policy approaches 
and levers that states use to reach their emissions reduction 
targets. Private environmental governance solutions could be 
encouraged to complement efforts like the CPP.  
•  Combating climate change will require multiple approaches. 
Public and private actors should each pay greater attention to 
and learn from each other’s practices and experiences.
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to achieve these goals, including the 
adoption of cap-and-trade programs 
or joining existing regional cap-and-
trade schemes. 
Yet even this ambitious rule—per-
haps the most significant regulation 
to date in the United States aimed 
at curbing greenhouse gas emis-
sions—cannot solve the global climate 
change problem on its own. Interna-
tional governments, states, regions, 
local governments, and private actors, 
including multinational firms, must 
also play a role. This Issue Brief will 
focus specifically on the ways in which 
private firms are adopting tools that 
mirror public law instruments and 
incorporating them into core business 
practices. It will focus in particular on 
the ways in which private actors have 
adopted internal carbon fees (similar 
to a public carbon tax) and private 
cap-and-trade schemes (like public 
emissions trading schemes) to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Such 
private environmental governance has 
a role to play in addressing climate 
change. Public and private actors 
should each therefore pay more atten-
tion to what the other is doing, and 
also consider new ways to link systems 
and create hybrid governance models.7 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
PARALLELS
When one thinks of environmental 
regulation, one often assumes that the 
government—federal or state—is the 
regulator, with private firms as the pri-
mary regulatory targets. In the heyday 
of environmental legislation beginning 
in the 1970s, the federal government 
not only created the EPA, but adopted 
significant national legislation on pol-
lution control to protect the nation’s 
air, water and land from the disposal or 
improper releases of pollutants. These 
laws, and the regulations that followed, 
utilized different public policy instru-
ments to achieve environmental goals, 
including prescriptive rules, property 
rights, market-leveraging solutions like 
taxes and subsidies, tradable permits, 
informational governance, procure-
ment and insurance, among other 
approaches.8 But Congress has not 
enacted any major new (or amended 
any major existing) pollution con-
trol statutes since the 1990s. Other 
government actors—states, munici-
palities, and regional compacts—have 
stepped in to fill the void. And another 
 1  The primary source for this Issue Brief is Sarah E. Light, 
The New Insider Trading: Environmental Markets within 
the Firm, 34 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 1 (2015).  We are grateful to 
the editors of the Stanford Environmental Law Journal for 
their permission to use this material.  On the parallel ways 
in which public and private actors employ tools to address 
environmental harms, see also Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, 
Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance, 5 
Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. (forthcoming 2015).
 2  Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, (Aug. 3, 2015) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).  The final rule has not yet 
been published in the Federal Register.  The text of the rule 
is available at http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-
power-plan-existing-power-plants.  
 3  Carbon dioxide accounts for 82% of all greenhouse gas pol-
lution in the U.S. See http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/
ghgemissions/gases.html.
 4  The administration’s Climate Action Plan is available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/
president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.  
 5  EPA, http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/
sources/electricity.html.
 6  The ten warmest years on record have all occurred since 
1998. (Source: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/glob-
al/201413).
 7  Light, supra note 1; Light & Orts, supra note 1.  
 8  Light & Orts, supra note 1.
 9  For a general explanation of this theory, see Light & Orts, 
supra note 1.    
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FIGURE 1: U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN 2013
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Source: All emission estimates from the Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2013.
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set of actors—private firms and non-
governmental organizations—have 
likewise begun to adopt environmental 
standard-setting, either as part of their 
own environmental governance, or to 
set and enforce broader standards as 
third-party enforcement agents.
Private firms may view environ-
mental standard-setting as an oppor-
tunity to earn goodwill and additional 
profit, or perhaps they are preparing 
for increased government regulation in 
the near future. Regardless of moti-
vation, private firms, including large 
multinational corporations, are making 
strategic business choices to address 
environmental harms such as climate 
change. One way in which private 
firms are acting is by adopting prac-
tices and private “instruments” that 
mirror public regulatory approaches, 
despite the private actors’ very different 
end goals and scope of governance.9  
Such private environmental gover-
nance solutions can have a significant, 
possibly global, impact in fighting 
climate change because of the multi-
national nature of the firms involved, 
as well as the magnitude of the green-
house gas emissions they can affect. A 
non-governmental organization, the 
CDP (formerly known as the Carbon 
Disclosure Project), provides both a 
reporting platform for firms to disclose 
their greenhouse gas emissions annu-
ally, and data analysis of that reporting. 
Recent analysis revealed that the top 
fifty out of more than four hundred 
private firms reporting to the CDP in 
2013 accounted for roughly 75 percent 
of all reported emissions.10 Consider a 
multinational firm like British Petro-
leum (BP), a firm that I analyze below 
for its adoption of a private carbon 
emissions trading platform in the early 
2000s. In 2013, BP reported a carbon 
footprint larger than the reported 2012 
emissions within each of sixteen U.S. 
states.11 Thus, private environmental 
governance can play a significant role 
in addressing greenhouse gas emissions 
globally in the absence of a single, 
international regime requiring emis-
sions reductions. A closer inspection 
of private environmental governance 
seems warranted in light of this fact, 
so I now turn to two examples of firms 
taking different approaches to reduc-
ing their carbon footprints that mirror 
mechanisms used and advocated by 
public regulators.
BP AND THE NEW “INSIDER 
TRADING”
Tradable permit systems, also called 
“cap-and-trade” schemes or emissions 
trading in the climate context, are 
often proposed as an efficient public 
policy solution to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. Under a tradable 
permit system, emissions are “capped” 
within a jurisdiction through the 
creation of a finite number of emis-
sions allowances. Often the number 
of allowances decreases over time 
to encourage continuing reductions. 
Firms can trade allowances based 
upon their calculus of whether it is 
cheaper to reduce emissions or pur-
chase an allowance on the market. 
Such a system minimizes the overall 
cost of abatement by guaranteeing that 
emissions reductions will proceed from 
cheapest-to-reduce sources first to 
most-expensive-to-reduce sources last. 
On the flip side of these efficiency and 
cost benefits, existing cap-and-trade 
systems have mixed records, with some 
instances of the oversupply of emis-
sions allowances, the grandfathering 
of high, existing pollution levels which 
undercut the programs’ goals, and the 
high administrative costs of creat-
ing, running, and policing the system. 
The United States, for example, has 
successfully used emissions trading to 
reduce sulfur dioxide (a component 
of acid rain) under the Clean Air Act. 
Sub-national bodies, including the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(a consortium of nine states) and the 
 10  CDP GLOBAL 500 CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT 2013.  
 11  The sixteen states are: AK, CT, DE, HI, ID, ME, MT, NE, NV, 
NH, NM, ND, OR, RI, SD, and VT, as well as DC. BP SUSTAIN-
ABILITY REVIEW 2013 (2013); EPA, CO2 Emissions from 
Fossil Fuel Combustion (2014).  
 12  David G. Victor & Johsua C. House, BP’s Emissions Trading 
System, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 2100, 2101 (2006).
 13  The specific focus here on BP’s emissions trading should not 
be read as an endorsement of BP’s environmental policies 
or practices more broadly, which must be read in context, 
including in the context of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill.  
 14  S. 2940 (113th Cong. 2015).  
 15  I note that other private institutions have adopted or an-
nounced their intention to adopt internal carbon pricing, 
including the Disney Corporation and Yale University.  See 
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REPORT, THE WALT DISNEY 
COMPANY (2014); Yale University, Presidential Carbon Task 
Force Report (2015).  I distinguish the adoption of a carbon 
fee from the use by a firm of a “shadow” carbon price in 
the context of investment decisions, where no fee is actu-
ally “collected” from business units.  More than 150 firms 
worldwide have begun to incorporate shadow carbon pricing 
into their investment decisions.  CDP, GLOBAL CORPORATE 
USE OF CARBON PRICING: DISCLOSURES TO INVESTORS 
(2014).  
 16 TAMARA “TJ” DICAPRIO, MICROSOFT CORP., BECOMING 
CARBON NEUTRAL: HOW MICROSOFT IS STRIVING TO 
BECOME LEANER, GREENER, AND MORE ACCOUNTABLE 
(2012), available at http://tinyurl.com/n26rxcx; TAMARA 
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state of California have implemented 
tradable permit regimes specifically 
to address greenhouse gas emissions. 
The new CPP expressly permits states 
to adopt tradable permit systems or to 
join existing regional systems to meet 
their emissions reduction goals. 
Before the establishment of the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS), and UK public 
laws regulating emissions, BP adopted 
an internal, private emissions trad-
ing program within the firm. In 1999, 
BP launched the system as a “pilot” 
initiative, and in 2000, the firm imple-
mented the policy firm-wide. Its goal, 
as stated publicly by the CEO, was 
to reduce emissions by 10% (relative 
to a 1990 baseline) by 2010. Several 
motivations prompted the adoption 
of this internal trading scheme. Firm 
managers wanted to develop exper-
tise in emissions allowance trading 
prior to the implementation of any 
public regulation; to gain credibility 
when they lobbied on behalf of emis-
sions trading as the best public policy 
alternative; to craft a solution for its 
decentralized and diverse business 
units; and to drum up goodwill and 
reputational benefits as a result of its 
efforts. By 2002, BP terminated the 
program, having already exceeded its 
10 percent reduction target—nearly 
eight years ahead of schedule. 
The design of this internal trading 
system came with challenges similar 
to those faced by public regulators 
when crafting a public emissions trad-
ing platform. BP’s managers had to 
determine an appropriate cap, establish 
an administrative infrastructure (i.e., 
collection, reporting, and data man-
agement), and allocate initial emis-
sions allowances at the outset—all of 
which are politically and operation-
ally complex tasks. To administer the 
program on an ongoing basis, the firm 
centralized some operations. It created 
a Climate Steering Group responsible 
for all climate policy and employed 
experienced oil and gas traders to 
construct the actual trading platform. 
But the firm left the actual “insider 
trading” to its various business units, 
each of which could determine on its 
own whether to designate traders with 
a commercial background, as opposed 
to a background in the environment, 
health, or safety. It also authorized 
managers in the different business 
units to enforce compliance, and this 
became part of each manager’s perfor-
mance contract.12 Business units did 
not exchange money when permits 
were traded, so as to avoid unwanted 
tax consequences. Likewise, the firm 
did not want this effort to affect how 
its managers deployed capital, so BP 
created a special fund for emissions-
reduction investments that might not 
otherwise meet BP’s return on invest-
ment criteria.
Originally inspired by public 
cap-and-trade systems, BP’s emissions 
trading platform now has lessons for 
public regulators, as well as other pri-
vate actors. The commitments created 
by the CEO’s public statements (the 
10 percent reduction plan) provided 
accountability. Partnering with the 
Environmental Defense Fund, a 
respected non-governmental organi-
zation, to craft the emissions trading 
system provided additional credibility. 
On the flip side, managers tolerated 
non-compliance when the price of 
emissions allowances rose more than 
expected, and the firm ended the 
program when it could have continued 
to reduce emissions further. Despite 
the imperfect design and other limita-
tions of this “insider trading” (e.g., 
speculative trading, price spikes, and 
toleration of non-compliance), BP’s 
platform for emissions trading allowed 
it to reduce emissions significantly.13 
MICROSOFT’S INTERNAL 
CARBON FEE
Another approach to addressing 
“TJ” DICAPRIO, MICROSOFT CORP., THE CARBON FEE: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013), available at http://tinyurl.
com/lotams6.
 17 The CDP estimates that Microsoft’s carbon fee is in the $6 
to $7 per ton range, notably less than the roughly $10-$80 
per ton “fees” utilized by the more than 150 global firms that 
use shadow carbon pricing systems to make investment 
decisions. (Source: CDP) The company’s Chief Environmen-
tal Strategist, Robert Bernard, has explained that Microsoft 
sets the fee by examining the price for carbon offsets on a 
quarterly basis.
 18  A good example of greenwashing is Volkswagon’s recent 
touting of its diesel engines as “clean diesel,” notwithstand-
ing its use of defeat devices to cheat on emissions tests for 
nitrogen oxides.  
 19  New Jersey’s decision to withdraw from the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative in 2011 is an example of a public 
parallel. (Source: REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, 
www.rggi.org).  
 20  EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/prog-
ress-cleaning-air-and-improving-peoples-health.
NOTES
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climate change is the use of carbon 
taxes, which put a price on the nega-
tive externalities caused by pollution, 
and thus force firms to internalize 
these costs. The United States has 
never adopted a carbon tax. Previ-
ous efforts, for example, to propose 
a “BTU tax” under President Clin-
ton, demonstrated significant issues 
of political feasibility, although two 
Senators recently introduced a new 
carbon tax bill called the American 
Opportunity Carbon Fee Act.14 In 
addition to these political feasibility 
challenges, carbon taxes have design, 
implementation, and durability chal-
lenges, though many economists 
would agree that these issues are less 
complex than those posed by emis-
sions trading. Interestingly, despite 
the political feasibility limitations in 
the public sphere, a number of private 
actors have recently adopted private 
carbon fees to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.15 
In the summer of 2012, Micro-
soft announced its goal to become 
carbon neutral in its data centers, 
software development labs, offices, 
and employee business air travel.16 
The company decided that the best 
way to provide incentives for emis-
sions reductions within its business 
units was by using a carbon fee, but 
only if the mechanics were simple and 
did not distract employees from their 
primary value creation activities. The 
added benefit was that implement-
ing a carbon fee could raise funds for 
other emissions-reduction activities. 
The issues with designing this pri-
vate, internal carbon fee mirror those 
of establishing a public carbon tax. 
Microsoft had to set the correct “price” 
for each marginal unit of emissions, 
determine the scope of emissions 
covered by the fee, and administer 
the system, which included creating 
processes for collection, management, 
and enforcement of compliance.17 The 
fee is collected through the company’s 
existing “chargeback” system, mir-
roring how government regulators 
could rely on an existing tax system to 
collect a carbon tax. Using an existing 
system reduces administrative costs. 
The administration is handled by a 
partnership between the company’s 
Environmental Sustainability team 
and its Corporate Finance depart-
ment. And this is a crucial point: by 
not isolating the carbon fee program 
as a “sustainability” measure, but 
rather classifying it as a strategic 
financing and accounting measure, 
Microsoft has embedded the carbon 
fee into its core business practices. 
This could have a public parallel, as I 
discuss in the Policy Recommenda-
tions section below.
Unlike BP’s emissions trading 
program, Microsoft’s carbon fee did 
not allow for the grandfathering of 
existing emissions levels. The business 
units responsible for carbon emissions 
feel the financial impact of the fee in 
direct proportion to their emitting 
activities, as an incentive for innova-
tive reduction strategies. But similar 
to BP, Microsoft is a global firm 
and operates in over 100 countries. 
Though its carbon fee does not apply 
to all of its divisions, the transnational 
scope of this internal policy is signifi-
cant. By the end of the program’s first 
year ( June 2013), Microsoft had met 
its goal of becoming carbon neutral 
in its selected business units. The 
majority of reductions resulted from 
purchases of renewable energy.
As with the BP case, there are 
some interesting lessons here. Repu-
tational (and environmental) ben-
efits aside, Microsoft has figured out 
that its use and promotion (to other 
firms) of a carbon fee program has 
the potential to create new business 
opportunities for the firm. Many 
of Microsoft’s suggestions for how 
other firms could administer a carbon 
fee would create new customers for 
Microsoft’s core business of software 
and technology. This bodes well for 
the durability of its use of the fee. 
For example, if another private firm 
seeks to purchase Renewable Energy 
Certificates or carbon credits to offset 
emissions, Microsoft now hosts a 
platform for such transactions on its 
cloud. This is a clear example of how 
thinking about the long-term benefits 
of carbon-emissions reductions may 
be worthwhile from a business stand-
point. Furthermore, the continued use 
of the carbon fee by Microsoft sends 
the expressive message that private 
firms have a responsibility to combat 
climate change, even (and perhaps 
especially) in the absence of public 
prescriptive rules.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: 
A MULTI-FACETED BATTLE 
AGAINST GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE
The adoption of public law concepts 
by private firms shows that public 
environmental governance has had 
a significant influence over private 
environmental governance decisions. 
As the tables are turned, there are two 
takeaways from the private application 
of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade 
systems that policymakers and regula-
6publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
tors should consider in their ongoing 
attempts to combat climate change. 
But first, the caveats. 
There are many forms of private 
environmental governance, and each 
requires evaluation along a number 
of key dimensions. For example, all 
private environmental governance 
approaches are susceptible to “gre-
enwashing,” which occurs when 
an entity makes misleading public 
statements or otherwise creates a 
falsely positive impression about its 
environmental performance.18 In 
addition, there is a concern that since 
private managers are often motivated 
by short-term profits, private gover-
nance solutions can be terminated 
on a whim (though there are public 
parallels here, too).19 Such limitations 
of private environmental governance 
must be considered alongside the fol-
lowing recommendations.
The first implication from these 
private case studies is that signifi-
cant progress in reducing emissions 
can come from embedding programs 
like emissions trading platforms and 
carbon fees into core business strategy. 
Employing fees and trading—core 
functions of many businesses—can 
help to avoid the “siloing” of carbon 
reduction programs as health, safety, 
and environmental issues. Based on 
Microsoft’s example, public regula-
tors should consider the importance 
of making regulations feel like a core 
part of business strategy, rather than 
a “compliance” issue. Here, the public 
lesson may be to create a partnership 
and shared jurisdiction between the 
EPA and another agency that already 
has authority and credibility with 
the financial side of private firms (for 
example, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or the Internal Revenue 
Service), when it comes to the admin-
istration of public law environmental 
regulations, thereby broadening the 
goal of emissions reduction from an 
issue solely of environmental  
concern to one of business and finan-
cial concern. 
The second lesson here is for 
business leaders. While “tax” may be a 
four-letter word in the United States 
as a matter of policymaking, the fact 
that more than 150 firms globally 
have adopted shadow carbon pricing 
to make investment decisions, and 
several leading firms and now Univer-
sities have adopted carbon fees, sug-
gests that private carbon pricing may 
be a strategy that is gaining credence 
in the fight against climate change in 
the private sphere. 
The second implication reiter-
ates a common thread from this brief, 
specifically that climate change, as a 
global issue, requires public regula-
tors to recognize the potential con-
tributions of global multinational 
firms. The Clean Power Plan’s flex-
ibility, including its recognition that 
increased energy efficiency in electric 
power generation is a building block 
to meet its goals, suggests that private 
environmental governance solutions 
could help firms reduce emissions. 
Policymakers, regardless of what 
happens with the rollout of the CPP, 
should be hesitant to employ tech-
nology-based prescriptive standards 
to achieve emissions reductions in the 
future because this type of regula-
tion discourages the use of innovative 
private governance solutions.
CONCLUSION
Since 1970, air pollution in the U.S. 
has decreased by roughly 70 percent 
while gross domestic product has 
grown by more than 200 percent.20 
The Clean Power Plan, and the Cli-
mate Action Plan in general, take pos-
itive steps in the ongoing fight against 
anthropogenic climate change, but 
they are not the whole story. Private 
firms already are making proactive 
decisions to internalize the negative 
externalities of pollution, as is evident 
from the cases of BP, Microsoft, and 
many other firms. The new “insider 
trading,” the use of carbon fees, and 
the expressive messages generated by 
private actors in the absence of global 
regulation can complement existing 
public environmental governance. 
Despite the limitations of private 
environmental governance, the sheer 
global reach of private firms, as well 
as their ability both to learn from and 
teach public regulators about effec-
tive emissions reduction solutions, 
equips them with the capacity to 
make a significant, positive impact on 
the environment. Combating climate 
change will require multiple actors—
and more than one approach.
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